Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments by Coricelli, Giorgio et al.
IHS Economics Series
Working Paper 151
March 2004
Partner Selection in Public Goods 
Experiments
Giorgio Coricelli
Dietmar Fehr
Gerlinde Fellner
Impressum
Author(s):
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner
Title:
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
ISSN: Unspecified 
2004 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1550/
151 
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
 
 
 
 
 
Partner Selection in Public 
Goods Experiments 
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner 
151
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
 
 
 
 
 
Partner Selection in Public 
Goods Experiments
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner 
 
March 2004 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
 Contact: 
 
Giorgio Coricelli 
Department of Economics 
University of Siena 
Piazza S. Francesco 7 
53100 Siena, Italy 
?   +39/0577/235058 
fax: +39/0577/232661 
email: gcoricelli@unisi.it 
 
Dietmar Fehr 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
1060 Vienna, Austria 
?:  +43/1/599 91-182 
fax: +43/1/599 91-555 
email:  fehr@ihs.ac.at 
 
Gerlinde Fellner 
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems 
Strategic Interaction Group 
Kahlaische Str. 10 
07745 Jena, Germany 
?   +49/3641/686 643 
fax: +49/3641/686 623 
email: fellner@mpiew-jena.mpg.de 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian
Federal Ministry of Education and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first
institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in Austria.
The Economics Series presents research done at the Department of Economics and Finance and
aims to share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. As usual, authors bear full 
responsibility for the content of their contributions.  
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Ökonomie bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der 
Abteilung für Ökonomie und Finanzwirtschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne
Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche
Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary 
contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-
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unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. 
Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains 
stable. 
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1 Introduction
Mounting evidence on reciprocal behavior in various social interactions (Andreoni
1988, Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, Isaac and Walker 1988) suggests that the usually
observed decline of contributions in public goods experiments is mainly due to the
influence of low contributors and reciprocal reaction of cooperators. In repeated pub-
lic goods experiments subjects usually start contributing a large proportion of their
endowment and then drastically reduce their contribution during the subsequent in-
teractions. When starting over with a new sequence of repeated public good games,
average contributions typically rise again substantially before they decrease, which
is commonly referred to as the restart effect. These phenomena are robust against
variations of the game, e.g., group size, marginal per-capita return, or partner and
stranger design (e.g., Andreoni 1988, Andreoni and Croson forthcoming, Croson
1996, Ledyard 1995), and indicate that the decline in contributions is not due to
learning the incentive structure of the game, but to reciprocity; meaning that “in
response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more coop-
erative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile
actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal” (cf. Fehr and Ga¨chter
2000, p. 159).
In order to address this conjecture, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2001) sorted par-
ticipants in a public good experiment according to their initial contribution into
high, middle and low contributors. Highly cooperative individuals who interacted
repeatedly with similar types sustained high cooperation during the course of the
experiment with only little decline, whereas subjects in the less cooperative group
continued to free-ride. This evidence impressively confirms the hypothesis that het-
erogeneity of individuals and reciprocity are the major driving forces of poor effi-
ciency in privately providing public goods and give raise to the idea that specific
regrouping might improve the sustainment of cooperation.
The fact that in daily life people are often able to choose their interaction part-
ners can be considered as an endogenous regrouping device, which is also an effective
way to escape exploitation. Indeed, people frequently change or quit relationships
with individuals who are not fulfilling the expected cooperative standards and look
out for better opportunities, even if it involves substantial costs. Economic examples
are various; producers, for instance, break-off established relationships and switch to
different suppliers, managers lay off and recruit employees for work teams, families
migrate to “better” districts or neighborhoods, and even sports teams spend huge
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amounts on purchasing their future team members.
Main object of the present study is to investigate if endogenous regrouping in-
volving self-determined cost is effective in raising the voluntary contribution to a
public good. We provide subjects with the opportunity to select their future inter-
action partner in a two-person public good game and employ two plausible selec-
tion mechanisms, unidirectional and bidirectional. Cooperative behavior in these
two treatments of partner selection is compared to control treatments with random
rematching. Evidence indicates an increase in cooperation particularly with unidi-
rectional partner selection compared to the control treatments. Despite theoretical
predictions, the monetary effort for choosing a partner is substantial highlighting
the importance of deliberately establishing and quitting particular relationships.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related lit-
erature, especially experimental studies on endogenous regrouping in social dilemma
situations and summarizes again our research agenda. Section 3 proceeds with illus-
trating the design and procedure of our experiment and section 4 reports the findings.
Finally, section 5 concludes the paper with a brief discussion.
2 Related literature
In the economic literature, Tiebout (1956) was the first to propose local governments
and the “freedom to move/choose” to overcome the conclusion of Musgrave (1939)
and Samuelson (1954) that no market solution for public good provision at the
central level can be found. Migration thus can solve the problem of efficient public1
provision of collective goods. In particular, the larger the number of communities
the higher the opportunity of heterogeneous agents to find the community that
best fulfills their preferences, which pertain to both economic and non-economic
variables, like the desire to associate with “nice people” (cf. Tiebout 1956, p. 418).
In the context of a public good game, nice people are those who increase the group
benefit by prosocial behavior (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000).
Ehrhart and Keser (1999) tried to reproduce an experimental environment that
corresponds to the world depicted by Tiebout (1956). Subjects were free to move to
or create a new community (group) at a small fixed cost, based on the information
about average group contributions and the history of per capita returns from the
public good in each group. Although the standard Nash-solution of the game is
1 While Tiebout’s model is concerned with the public provision of public goods, Glomm and Lagunoff
(1998), for instance, propose an extension of the model to private provision of public goods.
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to contribute nothing and never incur the cost of switching or creating a group,
results of this experiment demonstrate significantly higher average contributions
compared to standard public good experiments and frequent migration across groups.
Especially, cooperators tried to escape free riders who in turn attempted to “chase”
the former. Although the findings seem convincing, economic incentives to contribute
to the public good repeatedly change along with group size: While the individual
return from the contribution to the public good decreases in group size, the social
benefit increases. These opposing dynamics render it difficult to disentangle the
effects of the change in group size and the freedom to move.
By using the standard voluntary contribution mechanism in a public good exper-
iment with group sizes of four Page et al. (2002) investigated endogenous regrouping.
Based on the information about past average contributions of their fellows, subjects
were asked to rank others expressing their desire to be matched together, whereby
a small fixed amount was charged for each rank. According to an algorithm cal-
culating mutual rank assignments, subjects were assigned to new groups of four.
Average contributions in the regrouping condition were significantly higher than in
the baseline, and the vast majority of subjects chose to rank at least once in the
experiment. In the baseline treatment, however, subjects repeatedly interacted in
the same group throughout the experiment, thus lacking potential restart effects,
which might already trigger the results in favor of higher efficiency with endogenous
regrouping.
Hauk and Nagel (2001) experimentally studied a finitely repeated prisoners’
dilemma game with two different partner selection mechanisms. Subjects could
choose to take an outside option, which gave them a payoff higher than the one
received when being exploited, or to enter the game, where they had to play with a
partner who had been unilaterally or mutually selected. In the unilateral treatment
the decision of one of the two potential partners to enter was enough to play the
game, whereas in the mutual treatment both had to agree. Results of this experi-
ment suggest that unilateral partner selection is more effective in lowering defection
and increasing the proportion of unconditional cooperators in comparison to mutual
selection.
The importance of investigating the freedom to choose interaction partners in so-
cial dilemma situations has been endorsed previously (e.g., Hayashi and Yamagishi
1998). However, little attention has yet been paid to the question whether coop-
erative behavior is sensitive to the institutional design of choosing the interaction
partner. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, until now no attempt has been
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made to elicit subjective valuation of being able to choose the interaction partner.
Both issues are addressed in our study.
3 Experimental design and procedure
Aside from concentrating on the two main topics above, the experimental design
attempts to cover two methodological concerns: First, in contrast to Page et al.
(2002), our control treatments comprise random rematching of subjects with the
same frequency as partner selection in the experimental treatments, thereby testing
whether mere restart effects already account for the possible efficiency increase found
in their study. Second, providing the opportunity to select an interaction partner
requires publicizing the past behavior of participants. The prospect of having such
information announced may by itself trigger more cooperative behavior. Thus, in
order to disentangle this reputation effect from the efficacy of partner selection, we
additionally consider a control treatment without revealing past behavior.
In general, our experiment comprises six sequences of a five-period public good
game, in which subjects interact repeatedly with the same partner. At the end of
each sequence new pairs are formed within a constant group of six subjects. Sub-
jects are identifiable by a unique code (ID) from “A” to “F” that is once randomly
assigned to group members for the whole experiment. Rematching of subjects into
pairs is done either randomly (two control treatments) or endogenously (two exper-
imental treatments). In the first experimental treatment endogenous rematching is
based on a unidirectional selection mechanism (unidirectional), whereas in the sec-
ond treatment it resembles a mechanism based on two-sided selection (bidirectional).
In the two control treatments (random partner rematching and random partner re-
matching without history) partners are randomly determined at the beginning of
each sequence. In each treatment subjects are aware of participating in a finitely
repeated public good experiment with the same partner during one sequence but
possibly another partner out of the group of six in other sequences. The particular
partner rematching mechanism is explained in detail before the experiment starts.
3.1 The two-person public good game
In each round subjects receive an endowment of 25 experimental currency units
(ECU).2 Each subject can contribute part or all of her endowment to a public good
2 The exchange rates to ¤ is 100:1, i.e. 100 ECU correspond to ¤ 1.
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receiving a constant marginal return of 0.8 from each ECU invested. The decision
about the contribution to the public good is made simultaneously. At the end of each
round subjects receive feedback about the total amount contributed to the public
good by both partners, and their payoff in this round. The individual payoff pii is:
piti = (y
t
i − gti) + a
n∑
i=1
gti with n = 2, a = 0.8 (1)
whereby yi
t is the endowment in each round, gi
t is the amount contributed to the pub-
lic good by subject i and
∑n
i g
t
i is the sum of contributions of the two partners. Fol-
lowing the backward induction rationale, zero contribution is the only strategy that
survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies in this finite game, whereas
the socially efficient outcome is achieved when both partners contribute their entire
endowment. While the parameters of the public good games are constant for all treat-
ments (see the instructions in the Appendix A.1), partner rematching mechanisms
and information provided at the end of each sequence vary between treatments.
3.2 Endogenous partner selection treatments
For both endogenous partner selection treatments subjects receive a fixed amount
of 100 ECU that can be used for partner selection. Each ECU that is not invested
in partner selection is added to the payoff. Applying again the backward induction
rationale, a contribution of zero and hence no investment in the partner selection
mechanism is the only strategy that survives repeated elimination of dominated
strategies. However, by employing partner selection we want to explore individuals’
evaluation of the opportunity to choose a partner instead of being randomly paired.
3.2.1 Unidirectional partner selection
In the treatment with unidirectional partner selection subjects can use their endow-
ment of 100 ECU for bidding in a two-stage second-price auction for the right to
choose their preferred partner (see Appendix A.4).
At the end of a sequence of public good games, i.e. after five rounds, subjects
receive information about each group member’s past contributions to the public
good and the matching of the respective pairs. Then, subjects are asked to submit
a ranking of the other five group members according to their preference of being
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paired. Afterwards, they can bid any amount between 0 and 100 ECU on the right
to choose their partner for the next sequence of public good games.
The winner, who bids the highest amount, pays a price corresponding to the
second highest bid and is entitled to choose any of the other five group members.
Once the first pair is determined, a second stage with the same auction mechanism
as the first one follows, including only the four remaining group members. Their
identification codes and matching is again displayed together with the past contribu-
tions. The winner of the second auction, who pays the second highest bid, chooses
then one of the three available subjects as partner and the last pair is thus residually
determined.
Bids that do not win are not deducted from subjects’ final earnings. In case
of ties in the winning bid, the winner is randomly chosen among those involved,
whereas in case of no positive bid the partner rematching is done randomly, which
is eventually announced to the subjects. Before starting the next sequence, the ID
of the new partner is displayed on screen.
3.2.2 Bidirectional partner selection
Like in the unidirectional treatment, information on past contributions and the
matching of group members is publicized after each sequence. Then, subjects are
asked to allocate their endowment according to their willingness to find a new partner
(see Appendix A.5). Subjects can either keep the whole amount of 100 ECU adding
to their payoff or can allocate positive amounts to one or more of the group members.
Assigned amounts are only deducted from the endowment but not added to any
person’s payoff.
Once everyone has decided on allocating amounts the computer rematches sub-
jects into pairs according to the maximizing auctioneer’s revenue principle using the
following algorithm: For each possible combination of pairs within the group of six,
mutual assignments of points are calculated and summed up. Subsequently, the spe-
cific combination of pairs that maximizes the sum of mutual assignments is selected
for implementation. Mutual agreement is granted when two subjects allocate the
entire available amount to each other; as in this case they will end up together for
sure.3 Assigning positive amounts to more than one group member enables subjects
to express their preference in case of indifference between participants or to state
their ranking of group members.
3 For that reason, it is necessary to provide a fixed amount of extra endowment to everyone.
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If nobody allocates a positive amount or if everyone allocates the same amount
to everyone else random matching is announced and employed. Before entering the
next sequence, subjects learn the ID of their new partner.
3.3 Random partner rematching treatment
In the first control treatment participants are randomly rematched into pairs (see
Appendix A.2). However, the information about group members received at the
end of each sequence is the same as in the two experimental treatments, i.e. past
contributions of each group member as well as matching of group members. The
timing of this information screen is self-paced; subjects can decide when to exit the
screen pressing a button. Once all group members have exited the information screen
180 seconds pass before the next sequence starts. This period of time, called cooling
off period, has been introduced in order to induce a similar time interval between
each sequence of the experiment as in the treatments with partner selection. Before
entering the new sequence, the ID of the new partner is displayed.
3.4 Random partner rematching treatment without history
The second control treatment is identical to the first one with one major exception:
At the end of each sequence, information on past contributions of group members is
not provided (see Appendix A.3), still the matching of subjects is revealed. Previous
experimental evidence on the augmenting effect of providing information about indi-
vidual contributions on cooperation are ambiguous (see, e.g., Sell and Wilson 1991,
Weimann 1994). In this treatment, however, general reputation effects by disclosing
contribution histories of group members cannot affect behavior. By comparing the
two control treatments, we are able to tell if these general reputation effects are
already a major source of increasing cooperation and – in case of no difference in
the results between the random partner rematching treatment and the experimen-
tal treatments – might even be more important than introducing partner selection.
However, albeit foreclosing results, this speculation cannot be confirmed.
3.5 Experimental procedure
In total, 144 students from various disciplines at Jena University volunteered to
participate, the 59 males and 85 females aging from 18 to 50 (M = 23.35, SD = 3.71).
Subjects were invited to take part in a decision experiment via a mailing list or
personal recruitment at the campus. The experiment was computerized using z-tree
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(Fischbacher 1999) in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute for
Research into Economic Systems and took 6 sessions with 24 subjects each. Each
session lasted for about 70 minutes, and average earnings amounted to ¤ 14.9
(SD = 2.3) including a show-up fee of ¤ 2.50.
Figure 1 displays the sequence of events in the experiment. After reading the
instructions and answering control questions, which were checked privately by the ex-
perimenters, subjects in all treatments started with the first sequence of five rounds
public good games in randomly matched pairs. Afterwards, the respective rematch-
ing procedure (random or endogenous) was applied, subsequent to receiving informa-
tion on the matching of pairs (in all treatments) and either learning the contribution
history of group members (random rematching, unidirectional selection, bidirectional
selection) or not (random rematching without history). At the beginning of the next
sequence of public good games, subjects had to confirm to have read the identifica-
tion code of their new partner on screen. The procedure of partner rematching was
repeated five times, concluding with a final sequence of public good games. After
completing a short socioeconomic questionnaire, subjects were paid privately.
4 Results
This section starts with some descriptive results and subsequently tests for differ-
ences between endogenous and random partner rematching on the aggregate, with
respect to increases in cooperation due to endogenous rematching mechanisms as
well as qualitative differences in contribution behavior. Finally, evidence on the
monetary effort for partner selection as well as on patterns of individual behavior is
presented.
4.1 Contribution behavior
Comparison of partner selection and random partner rematching
Figure 2 displays the average contribution over time to the public good for both ex-
perimental treatments (unidirectional and bidirectional) and the two control treat-
ments (random rematching and random rematching without history). A Kruskal-
Wallis test rejects the hypothesis of equivalence between the mean contributions
over time for the four treatments (χ2df=3 = 35.58, p < .01).
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Figure 1: Sequence of events in the experiment
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Figure 2: Average contribution to the public good over time
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Comparing the two control treatments we cannot reject the hypothesis of equiv-
alence of sample means4 (MR = 16.79, SDR = 4.27,MRwH = 17.55, SDRwH = 3.23,
robust rank order test: U`m=n=6 = 0.22, p > .10
5). Furthermore, Figure 2 reveals no
substantial difference between the two patterns of contributions at any time during
the experiment, indicating that the reputational effect of publicizing contribution
histories only plays a minor role.
Result 1 Voluntary contribution to the public good is not affected by revealing in-
dividual contribution histories.
To answer the question whether the freedom to choose a partner significantly
increases inclination to contribute to a public good, we start by testing the differences
between the endogenous selection treatments and the random partner rematching
treatment.6
Taking into account average contributions throughout all six sequences of public
good games, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equivalence between random
partner rematching and unidirectional partner selection (robust rank order test:
U`m=n=6 = 1.59, .05 < p < .10) and bidirectional partner selection, respectively
(U`m=n=6 = 0.76, p > .10). However, Figure 2 indicates higher cooperation in the
unidirectional than in the random partner rematching treatment only in sequence
two to five. It might well be that in the first sequence, where pairs are randomly
formed and in the very last one, where the game has almost ended, the opportunity
of partner selection plays a minor role. Indeed, considering only the sequences 2 to 5,
the results are highly in favor of augmented cooperation with unidirectional partner
selection (MR = 16.70, SDR = 4.78,MUD = 21.20, SDUD = 2.68, robust rank order
test: U`m=n=6 = 2.62, p < .025).
Still, if unidirectional partner selection is indeed a successful instrument to fos-
ter cooperation, one should expect higher average contributions of the two pairs
that were voluntarily formed as opposed to the remaining pair that was residually
4 For all subsequent tests, we consider six independent observations, one for each group of six par-
ticipants, for each treatment.
5 Critical values for the robust rank order test are obtained from Siegel and Castellan (2000) and
are only available for p-values of 0.10, 0.05, 0.025 and 0.01.
6 We compare behavior to the random partner rematching treatment, since it equals the endoge-
nous selection treatments, except for random determination of partners. As we cannot reject the
hypothesis of equivalence of the two control treatments, we do not expect differing results when
comparing the endogenous regrouping mechanisms with the random partner rematching without
history. This intuition is confirmed by applying all tests as well to the treatment random partner
rematching without history.
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Table 1: Average contributions of pairs in the unidirectional treatment
Sequence Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
1 14.9 14.9 16.0
Endogenously formed Residual
2 23.7 20.6 18.5
3 20.3 23.3 19.2
4 22.6 21.9 20.0
5 24.5 23.1 16.6
6 22.2 21.9 10.9
Total average 22.7 22.2 17.0
determined. Table 1 provides an overview of average contributions of each pair in
total and for each sequence, separately. In sequence one, where group members are
randomly matched into pairs, contributions are roughly equal among pairs. Through-
out sequences, the difference in contributions between the endogenously formed pairs
and the remaining pair turns out significant (Friedman Test, χ2df=2 = 11.92, p < .01),
supporting the effectiveness of unidirectional partner selection in increasing cooper-
ation.7
Result 2 Unidirectional partner selection considerably improves cooperation com-
pared to random partner rematching.
In addition to quantitative data analysis, it is important to consider qualitative
effects, especially the time trend of behavior. The usual pattern of decreasing contri-
butions is also evident in our experiment. Figure 3 plots decay indices, calculated for
each treatment by the ratio of the difference between the contribution in the first and
the last round to the contribution in the first round, which illustrates the percent-
age decrease of contributions throughout each sequence. After the second sequence,
contributions in the endogenous partner matching treatments decrease less dramat-
ically (ME = 0.25, SDE = 0.13) than in the two controls (MR = 0.40, SDR = 0.16)
with random rematching (robust rank order test: U`m=n=12 = 3.28, p < .025). This
evidence implies the presence of a structural difference induced by the endogenous
selection procedures: cooperation in both partner selection treatments is more sta-
7 While cooperation is higher in the endogenously selected pairs, this difference is not reflected in
higher efficiency measured by relative earnings, i.e. actual earnings compared to the maximum
welfare level. Comparing efficiency per sequence of the endogenously selected pairs with the resid-
ual pair in the unidirectional treatment does not reveal significant differences, and neither does
comparing efficiency between the two pairs with the highest mutual assignments and the pair with
the least mutual assignments in the bidirectional partner selection treatment.
11
Figure 3: Decay index in each sequence by treatment
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ble than in the control treatments. Figure 3 also illustrates the “end game effect”,
indicating the dramatic reduction of contributions to the public good in the last
sequence of all treatments.
Result 3 Cooperation in the treatments with partner selection is more stable over
time than in the treatments with random partner rematching.
Comparison of partner selection mechanisms
In order to investigate whether cooperation is sensitive to the specific partner se-
lection mechanism, we compare behavior in the unidirectional and bidirectional
treatment and find significantly higher average contributions (robust rank order
test: U`m=n=6 = 3.07, p < .025) in the unidirectional selection treatment (MUD =
19.73, SDUD = 2.23) than in the bidirectional selection treatment (MBD = 14.86, SDBD =
4.01). Overall, the average contribution to the public good in the unidirectional treat-
ment corresponds to 79%, whereas in the bidirectional treatment it amounts to 59%
of the endowment. As Figure 2 illustrates, contributions are significantly lower in
the bidirectional treatment throughout rounds.
Result 4 The efficacy of partner selection in improving cooperation is sensitive
to the mechanism employed. Voluntary contributions are higher when partners are
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unidirectionally rather than bidirectionally selected.
While at least unidirectional partner selection fosters cooperation, overall effi-
ciency, i.e. the level of feasible welfare that is actually reached, is another important
indicator. We measure efficiency by the relation of individuals’ earnings to the max-
imum possible amount that can be earned by full cooperation of both partners.8
Average efficiency per sequence is highest in the unidirectional treatment (92%),
closely followed by the random selection treatment (88%), and lowest in the bidi-
rectional treatment (75%).9 Pairwise robust rank-order tests of the efficiency levels
aggregated over six matching groups reveal a significant difference of efficiency lev-
els only between the random selection and the bidirectional selection treatment
(U`m=n=6 = 5.26, p < .01), as well as the unidirectional and the bidirectional treat-
ment (U`m=n=6 = 10.46, p < .01). Although unidirectional partner selection enhances
cooperation compared to random selection, the relation cannot be confirmed when
efficiency is considered: Expenditures for partner selection seem to deplete the wel-
fare effect from high cooperation. Cooperation on a lower, although stable level, and
high monetary effort for partner selection is responsible for low efficiency levels in
the bidirectional selection treatment.
Result 5 While unidirectional partner selection does not increase overall efficiency,
bidirectional partner selection yields lower efficiency than random and unidirectional
selection.
4.2 Monetary effort for partner selection
Descriptive evidence
The boxplots of Figure 4 give a first impression of the distribution of bids in the
first and second auction for each unidirectional mechanism and of amounts assigned
for each bidirectional mechanism. Monetary effort for partner selection is dispersed
over the entire possible range from 0 to 100 and skewed to the ends of the inter-
val, implying that medians and quartile distances10 are rather suitable measures of
describing data.
8 To be able to compare the endogenous selection treatments with random partner rematching, the
additional endowment of 100 ECU that is received for each mechanism is taken into account when
calculating the maximum welfare for the unidirectional and the bidirectional treatment.
9 The first sequence in which subjects are randomly matched in any treatment is discarded for this
analysis.
10 Quartile distances are calculated as the difference of the third and second quartile.
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Figure 4: Boxplots of first and second bids in the unidirectional and amounts as-
signed in the bidirectional treatment over time
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Table 2 displays the 95%–confidence intervals around the median for the average
bids in the first and second auctions of the unidirectional treatment and for the
amount assignments in the bidirectional treatment. If 0 is not within the lower
boundary of the interval we can infer that average bids are significantly greater than
zero and thus reflect substantial monetary effort for influencing pair constitution.
In the unidirectional treatment, the median first bid amounts to 17.5 (QD =
37.6) and the median second bid to 10 (QD = 23.1). Table 2 leads to the conclusion
that bids in the unidirectional treatment are on average significantly higher than
zero, providing counterevidence to the theoretical Nash-prediction of zero bidding.
Regarding time patterns, a Friedman test reveals that neither first (χ2df=4 = 2.89, p =
.58) nor second bids (χ2df=4 = 0.81, p = .94) decline significantly over the auction
rounds.11 However, bids in the second auction are noticeably lower than in the first
auction.
11 Even with pairwise comparisons (Wilcoxon signed rank tests) of average bids throughout auctions
no difference can be found.
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Table 2: Confidence intervals for the average monetary effort for partner selection
in the unidirectional and bidirectional treatment
Treatment Median Q0.25 Q0.75 95% confidence interval
Unidirectional 1st Auction 17.5 1.3 38.9 [10;31]
2nd Auction 10 0.4 23.5 [1;51]
Bidirectional 49 16.5 65.6 [30;60]
The fraction of zero bids in the first and second auction (on average, 13.9% and
21.2%, respectively) is opposed to a considerable fraction of bids equal or higher
than 50 (19.6% and 14%, respectively). In total, five subjects out of 36 never bid a
positive amount in any auction. Random matching within one’s group due to equal
bids occurred one time in the first auctions and three times in the second auctions.
Result 6 Subjects’ bids for choosing a partner in the unidirectional treatment are
on average significantly greater than zero.
Comparing actual partner selection by auction winners with the rankings of
group members, the overwhelming majority of subjects (45 out of 55) acted consis-
tent with respect to the preferences they submit earlier, i.e. they chose the highest
ranked group member that was still available.
In the bidirectional partner selection treatment the median total amount as-
signed was 49 (QD = 49.1), which is significantly positive according to a 95%
confidence interval. Subjects spend considerable amounts of money to avoid random
rematching, which is - similar to the unidirectional treatment - contradictory to the
standard Nash-prediction. Only three of the 36 subjects were never willing to as-
sign amounts to preferred partners, whereas 17 subjects spent on average more than
half of their endowment. Over time, average amount assignments remain fairly con-
stant (Friedman-Test, χ2df=4 = 5.15, p = .27). On total average, 25% did not assign
amounts to any group member, 41.1% of the subjects stated one group member as
preferred partner, 7.2%, 6.1% and 5.6% of subjects seized the opportunity to assign
amounts to two, three and four group members, respectively, and 11.1% assigned
amounts to each group member, thereby providing a full ranking.
By relating the bids in the first auctions of the unidirectional treatment to
the amounts assigned for endogenous rematching in the bidirectional treatment, it
becomes evident that subjective eagerness to shape the future partnership is signifi-
cantly higher in the latter one (robust rank order test: U`m=n=6 = 3.03, p < .025).
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Result 7 Individuals in the bidirectional selection treatment exhibit higher mone-
tary effort for shaping the future partnership than individuals in the unidirectional
treatment.
To understand potential benefits from selecting a partner rather than being
randomly assigned, one has to consider the expected excess gains from two-sided
cooperation over two-sided defection.12 In the former case, subjects earn 200 ECU
per sequence, in the latter case the expected income amounts to 125 ECU, i.e. the en-
dowment accumulated over the five periods. Assuming merely payoff-maximization,
therefore, the difference of 75 ECU is a sensible measure of potential gains by ac-
tively engaging in partner selection . Even when deviating from the strict rationale
of dominant strategies, expenditures should not exceed 75 ECU. Remarkably, 10.6%
of bids in the first auctions, 10.3% of bids in the second auctions in the unidirectional
treatment and 25% of point assignments in the bidirectional treatment exceed this
value.
4.3 Behavior at the individual level
Reciprocal behavior
To investigate whether subjects base their contributions on past behavior of their in-
teraction partner a Panel Tobit regression with past own and partner’s contribution
to the lag one and their interaction as explanatory variables, and subjects’ individual
contributions as dependent variable is run. Table 3 shows that reciprocal behavior is
present in at least three of the four treatments as the coefficient for lagged partner
contribution is significant for the random partner rematching treatment and the uni-
directional and bidirectional partner selection treatments. Thus, participants adjust
their own contribution positively to the experienced contribution of their partner
in the previous round; they increase their contribution if their partner contribution
was high and decrease it when it was low. Additionally, we find that the own contri-
bution in the past round as well as its interaction with past partner contribution is
crucial for current behavior.
12 The worst case, i.e. a cooperator being repeatedly exploited by a full free-rider, is not reasonable
to consider, since this situation can easily be avoided by investing the whole endowment in the
private account.
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Table 3: Tobit regression on contributions
Dependent variable: individual contribution
Method: Panel Tobit regression gti ∈ [0; 25] with individual random effects
Variable Random Random Unidirectional Bidirectional
without history
Constant 1.91 (0.850)? 5.31 (1.14)?? 2.84 (1.01)?? 2.79 (0.72)??
Lagged partner
contribution gt−1j
0.26 (0.06)?? 0.07 (0.07) 0.28 (0.06)?? 0.22 (0.05)??
Lagged own
contribution gt−1i
0.32 (0.06)?? 0.07 (0.07)?? 0.32 (0.06)?? 0.30 (0.05)??
Interaction
gt−1j ∗ gt−1i 0.01 (0.003)
?? 0.02 (0.003) 0.01 (0.003)?? 0.01 (0.002)??
Log likelihood -2848.52 -2826.7 -2690.97 -2742.39
Wald chi2(3) 708.69 531.27 741.88 760.18
p > χ2 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Note: ? denotes significance at the 5% level, and ?? denotes significance at the 1% level.
Standard errors in parantheses.
Result 8 Reciprocal behavior is prominent especially in the random partner re-
matching and the two endogenous partner selection mechanisms.
Patterns of individual behavior for all treatments
Considering individual contributions to the public good, 1080 data points for each
treatment (contributions of 36 participants in 30 periods) are available. Based on
this large number of observations, roughly three clusters of behavior can be identi-
fied: free-riding, characterized by a contribution in the range of 0 to 9,13 cooperation,
defined by investing the whole endowment of 25 to the public good and the remain-
ing category in the middle range, that subsumes contributions from 10 to 24. Table
4 summarizes relative frequencies of these behavioral categories overall in the exper-
iment, but separately for the four treatments. According to a χ2–test on absolute
frequencies one can reject the hypothesis of equal distribution of behavioral cate-
gories among the four treatments (χ2df=6 = 129.13, p < .01).
Especially in the unidirectional treatment a high fraction of cooperative behav-
ior is observed which supports the evidence that unidirectional partner selection im-
13 Since observations of free-riders in the strict sense, i.e. contributions of only zero; are barely found
in the two endogenous partner selection treatments, we extend the strict definition of free-riding
behavior to an interval of an average contribution below 10 ECU.
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Table 4: Categories of individual behavior in the four treatments
Treatment Free riding Cooperation Middle range
(0 ≤ gi < 10) (gi = 25) (10 ≤ gi < 25)
Random 23.6% 46.3% 30.1%
Random without history 16.6% 46.1% 37.2%
Unidirectional 12.8% 53.2% 34.0%
Bidirectional 25.8% 33.0% 41.2%
proves the voluntary contribution to public goods. Considering only the last rounds
of each public good sequence even strengthens this finding: while free-riding notice-
ably outweighs cooperative behavior in the random rematching and the random
rematching without history treatments(47.2% to 30.6% and 41.7% to 30.6%, respec-
tively) as well as in the bidirectional partner selection treatment (43.5% to 25.4%),
in the unidirectional selection treatment cooperation is the modal behavior (43.5%)
followed by free-riding (25.0%).
Result 9 In the unidirectional treatment, full cooperation is the modal behavior
overall, and particularly in the final periods of the sequences and thus clearly domi-
nates free-riding.
Monetary effort and partner selection by behavioral types
The distinction of behavioral types according to contributions advises to take an
additional look at the activities of these types during partner selection. Very co-
operative subjects may display a different strategy of spending money for partner
selection than free-riders. Therefore, we examine the monetary effort for partner
selection in both treatments conditional on contribution patterns.
Deviating from the strict classification of individual types employed above, one
can apply a more flexible scheme of behavior with respect to average group behavior
and partner’s behavior in the previous sequence. Figures 5 and 6 display the average
monetary effort exhibited by individual types depending on the deviation of own
contributions in the previous sequence from the group average14 (below or above) and
the absolute deviation from the group average by the partner in the unidirectional
and the bidirectional treatment, respectively.15
14 Group average is calculated as the average of contributions in the previous sequence by all other
five group members
15 In the following, individuals who contribute more than the group average are alternatively referred
to as high contributors, whereas subjects who contribute less than the group average are referred
to as low contributors.
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Figure 5: Average bids in the unidirectional partner selection treatment subject to
own and partner’s deviation from average group contribution in the past
sequence
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The highest bids in the unidirectional treatment are submitted by individuals
who are contributing more than the group average and interact also with high coop-
erative partners as well as by individuals who are less cooperative than the average
and additionally have low cooperative partners. Remarkably, high contributors who
are stuck with a low cooperative partner are less willing to spend money on partner
selection than low contributors in the same situation.
In the bidirectional treatment, individuals contributing above average tend to
spend mostly more money on partner selection than those contributing below aver-
age. This relation is especially pronounced for very low as well as very high coopera-
tive partners. The highest monetary effort is, on average, exhibited by subjects who
are more cooperative than the average but are paired with low cooperative partner.
High contributors seem to be more concerned about selecting a partner than low
contributors.
To gain a deeper insight in the two different procedures of partner selection,
it is worthwhile to look at the constitution of pairs in the unidirectional and the
bidirectional treatment. Relying on the previous categorization of individual behav-
ior, Table 5 displays the classification of pairs according to the deviations of own
19
Figure 6: Average amounts assigned in the bidirectional partner selection treatment
subject to own and partner’s deviation from average group contribution
in the past sequence
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and partner’s contributions from the group average in the previous sequence for the
unidirectional and the bidirectional treatment, respectively.
In the unidirectional selection treatment the modal pair consists of one partner
contributing below and one contributing above average in the previous sequence.
This is not surprising, since individuals that contribute less than the group average
are most likely to be winners in an auction (40%, or 22 times out of 55 auctions)
Table 5: Frequencies of pair classifications aggregated over all five partner selection
mechanisms in the unidirectional and the bidirectional treatment
Deviation from the group average Unidirectional Bidirectional
Partner 1 Partner 2 treatment treatment
above above 15 16.7% 26 28.9%
above equal 6 6.7% 5 5.6%
above below 38 42.2% 25 27.8%
equal equal 12 13.3% 2 2.2%
equal below 9 10.0% 12 13.3%
below below 10 11.1% 20 22.2%
Total sum 90 100% 90 100%
Note: deviations from the past group average correspond to the following
intervals: above [1, 25], below [−1,−25] and equal (−1, 1).
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and tend to choose high contributors. Subjects who contribute more than the group
average win an auction in 30.9% of the cases, about as often as subjects whose con-
tributions lie around the average (29.1%). In the bidirectional treatment, however,
the most frequent pairings consist of two high contributors or a low and high contrib-
utor. In contrast to the unidirectional treatment, the monetary effort exhibited by
high contributors mostly exceeds that of low contributors (see Figure 6); therefore
high contributors more likely end up together in the bidirectional treatment than in
the unidirectional treatment.
In summary, behavior of high and low contributors differs considerably among
mechanisms. In the unidirectional treatment, high contributors bid low in contrast
to low contributors, whereas in the bidirectional mechanisms, high contributors are
willing to spend more money on shaping the future partnership than low contributors.
Recalling the finding of Ehrhart and Keser (1999) that cooperators try to escape free-
riders, while in turn, free-riders chase them, we find similar results in our experiment,
even though differences among partner selection mechanisms are prominent: in the
unidirectional treatment, high contributors are more passive while low contributors
try to chase them, whereas in the bidirectional treatment, high cooperative subjects
are more active in avoiding low cooperative ones than the latter are in chasing them.
Result 10 Partner selection differs across behavioral types as well as across treat-
ments: In the unidirectional treatment, low contributors are more engaged in partner
selection than high contributors, whereas in the bidirectional treatment, high contrib-
utors are more engaged in partner selection than low contributors.
To confirm this impression statistically, we contrast the fraction of behavioral
types who do not engage in active partner selection in both experimental treatments.
Table 6 displays absolute and relative frequencies of subjects in the three behavioral
categories (past contributions below, above or equal to the group average) who do
not submit a positive first bid16 (in the unidirectional treatment) or do not assign a
positive amount to any other group member (in the bidirectional treatment). At first
glance, subjects in the in the unidirectional treatment are generally less active (67
zero bids out of 180) than subjects in the bidirectional treatment (45 assignments
of zero out of 180).
16 In the unidirectional treatment, only the first bids are considered in order to have a direct compar-
ison to the bidirectional treatment, where the willingness to choose a partner is only elicited once
during a mechanism.
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Table 6: Proportion of subjects indifferent to random matching in the unidirectional
and bidirectional partner selection treatment subject to own deviation from
average group contribution in the past sequence
Deviation from group average
above below equal
n f n f n f total sum
unidirectional 29 43.3% 25 37.3% 13 19.4% 67
bidirectional 10 22.2% 28 62.2% 7 15.6% 45
Note: deviations from the past group average correspond to the following intervals:
above [1, 25], below [−1,−25] and equal (−1, 1).
A chi-square test for homogeneity reveals that the distribution of subjects who
are not investing in partner selection among behavioral categories differs between
the two partner selection treatments (χ2df=2 = 7.20, p < .05). Apparently, in the
unidirectional treatment high contributors rather abstain from bidding than low
contributors (43.28% vs. 37.32%), whereas in the bidirectional treatment the pat-
tern is reversed: less high contributors than low contributors are passive in partner
selection (22.2% vs. 62.22%). This evidence indicates that in the unidirectional treat-
ment, low contributors are more occupied by “chasing” high contributors, than the
latter are by fleeing away from them and looking for equal types. In the bidirectional
treatment, however, low contributors are more passive in assigning amounts than
high contributors, suggesting that high contributors are more engaged in affecting
the partner rematching, and thus potentially “fleeing away” from low contributors.
5 Discussion
In his seminal paper Tiebout (1956) suggests “voting with one’s feed” to overcome
the impracticality of a market solution to the provision of public goods. More pre-
cisely, individuals should be free to move to the communities that best satisfy their
preferences for collective goods. Similarly, recent literature on reciprocal behavior
suggests that grouping individuals by their cooperative disposition substantially in-
creases overall efficiency in public good provision, since initial high contributors
continue their cooperative behavior undisturbed by free-riders who, in turn, also
maintain their attitude facing similar co-players. In real life, the common retreat
from being exploited is to quit one’s membership in an abusive societal environ-
ment. The reason why social dilemmas are frequently well resolved in various fields
of social interaction might be the possibility to choose whom to collaborate with.
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Examples are various: As a scientist, one chooses the co-authors of a paper, people
decide on the neighborhood to live in for various reasons, such as safety or social
exchange with similar people, and coaches of soccer teams buy future players.
To investigate how the opportunity to choose the interaction partner in a social
dilemma affects cooperative behavior, we employ a repeated two-person public good
game where players can spend amounts on being paired with their desired partner
of a group of six. As illustrated by the previous examples of everyday life, the choice
to join a group can but need not necessarily rely on mutual agreement. Thus, the
infinite number of possible mechanisms how to endogenously create partnerships can
at least be divided in two broad categories of unidirectional selection, meaning one
partner chooses the other without her explicit agreement, or bidirectional selection,
where individuals need to have some degree of mutual appreciation to collaborate.
In our study, we compare unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection in a
public good game to control treatments with random partner rematching and elicit
subjects’ monetary effort for being able to choose their partners.
We find that unidirectional partner selection considerably fosters cooperation
and attenuates the usual decline of cooperation over time. For bidirectional part-
ner selection, we cannot confirm higher average cooperation compared to randomly
matched pairs, yet the usual decline of contributions over time is as well alleviated.
Investigating the presumably aggrandizing effect of publishing contribution histo-
ries of individuals on cooperation rates, we can conclude that this reputation effect
among group members does not play a major role.
Individuals are, on average, willing to spend significant amounts to avoid random
partner matching, whereby the average monetary effort is higher in the bidirectional
than in the unidirectional treatment. Surprisingly, the evaluation of choosing a part-
ner is not decreasing over time, even though cooperation is substantially high in the
unidirectional selection treatment and at least stable on a lower level in the bidirec-
tional selection treatment. Both mechanisms differ in how heterogeneous types of
contributors behave during partner selection. In the unidirectional treatment high
contributors engage little in bidding, while low contributors pursue active partner
selection by submitting higher bids. Conversely, in the bidirectional partner selection
treatment high contributors are assigning higher amounts to affect partner rematch-
ing than low contributors. Therefore, it is important to note that both the efficacy
of partner selection and the specific reaction of individuals with distinct cooperative
dispositions are sensitive to the matching method.
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In general, the opportunity to choose interaction partners seems to be one solu-
tion to the problem of the efficient private provision of collective goods, as it is a
natural way to punish free-riders by turning one’s back on them. Even when costs
of choosing partners are endogenous, constituting a realistic aspect in our view, in-
dividuals are willing to give up substantial parts of their income to determine their
future partnership.
Still, it has to be clarified why the two mechanisms of partner selection trigger di-
verse results in terms of contributions, efficiency and the monetary effort for partner
selection by different behavioral types. The most obvious reason why bidirectional
partner selection performs worse than unidirectional is, that the former gives raise
to an additional coordination problem within the social dilemma situation while in
the unidirectional treatment, partner selection is straightforward and easy to im-
plement. Additionally, being selected by someone – even though not necessarily on
the grounds of mutual appreciation – might enhance group identity (see Tajfel and
Turner 1979, for the theoretical concept) and thus reinforces commitment to the
partnership.
Our results resemble the superiority of Hauk and Nagel (2001)’s unilateral part-
ner choice for cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games. However, their mechanisms
imply the choice between exiting and earning a sure payoff, or entering the game
(on unilateral or mutual agreement) and hoping for a cooperative partner, whereas
in our setting subjects cannot exit the game but only strive for being matched
with a cooperative partner. However, the conclusion of both studies could be that
the natural intuition about mutual agreement in forming teams being superior to
unidirectional selection is failing. Mutual agreement may give raise to coordination
problems that are not existent when one partner is eligible for initiation of the re-
lationship. Even though individuals may be reluctant if selected by a non-desired
partner, resentments can be overcome by the entitlement of being chosen.
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Appendix A: Instructions and Control Questionnaire 
A.1. General instructions for the public good game in all treatments 
Welcome to the experiment 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment on individual decision making. If you 
read these instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable 
amount of money. Therefore, it is very important that you read these instructions carefully. 
The instructions handed to you serve your private information only. It is prohibited to 
communicate with other participants during the experiment.  In case you have questions, 
please raise your arm and one of the experimenters will come to your cabin and answer your 
question. If you violate these rules we will have to exclude you from the experiment and all 
payments.  
All amounts are displayed in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). The exchange rate is 100 
ECU = 1 EURO. At the end of the experiment you will privately receive your total payoff in 
Euros.  
At the beginning of the experiment participants are randomly divided into groups of 6. 
Throughout the whole experiment this group composition remains the same. The experiment 
is divided into 6 phases, whereby one phase lasts for 5 rounds. In total there are 30 rounds. 
 
At the beginning of the first phase pairs of subjects are randomly formed within the groups of 
6. Thus, each participant is randomly assigned one of the other group members, to whom we 
will subsequently refer as co-player. These pairings remain constant throughout the first phase, 
i.e. 5 rounds. Your decisions and the decisions of your co-player will determine your payoff 
in each round.  
 
After each phase you will get a new participant of your group as co-player. It is still possible 
that you interact with the same participant more than once. The detailed instructions for the 
formation of new pairs after phase one are provided below. 
 
Each group member receives an identification code (A to F), which remains the same 
throughout the whole experiment. Your actual identity will never be revealed during the 
experiment; that means no participant ever learns the actual identity of his/her group members. 
At the beginning of each phase your identification code as well as the identification code of 
your co-player is displayed on screen. This means you will know with whom you are paired in 
each phase.  
Each round of the experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how 
to distribute your endowment between a private account and a common project with your 
respective co-player. In the second stage you receive feedback on your payoff. 
Detailed description of the single rounds  
First Stage 
At the beginning of every round each participant receives 25 ECU as endowment. Your task 
is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how much you want to transfer 
to a private account (alternative A) and how much you want to contribute to a common 
project with your co-player. Your payoff in each round is the sum of the payoff from your 
private account and the payoff from the project. 
 
Your payoff from your private account (alternative A): 
For each ECU that you transfer to your private account you obtain one ECU payoff. That 
means, if you transfer x ECU to your private account, you receive exactly x ECU payoff from 
your private account. Noone else benefits from your private account. You specify the amount 
transferred to your private account by stating your contribution to the project:   
private account = 25 – contribution to the project 
 
Your payoff from the project (alternative B): 
The payoff you receive of the projects is calculated as follows: You obtain the sum of your 
and your co-player’s contribution that is multiplied by 0.8. This means: 
Your payoff from the project = 0.8 x (your contribution + your co-player’s contribution). 
For your co-player the income from the project is calculated just in the same way, i.e. your 
co-player receives exactly the same payoff from the project as you.  
 
Total payoff in one round: 
 
(25 – contribution to the project) + 0,8 x (sum of contributions to the project) 
        (payoff from alternative A) +                 (payoff from alternative B) 
 
For each ECU, that you transfer to your private account you receive a payoff of one ECU. 
Supposing you contributed this ECU to the project instead, then the sum of contributions to 
the project would rise by one ECU. Your payoff from the project would rise by 0.8 x 1 = 0.8 
ECU. However, your co-player’s payoff from the project would also rise by 0.8 ECU, so that 
the total payoff from the project for you and your co-player would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your 
contribution to the project therefore also raises the payoff of your co-player, as well as your 
co-player’s contribution raises your payoff. For each ECU that your co-player contributes to 
the project you earn 0.8 x 1 = 0.8 ECU. 
 
Below you see the screen on which you have to make your decision in each round.  
 
 
In the middle of the screen you see the current phase and round and your endowment.  
Your endowment is 25 ECU in each round. You decide how to distribute these 25 ECU 
between alternative A (private account) and alternative B (project) by stating the amount you 
want to contribute to the common project. (alternative B). For that, you have to type in a 
number between 0 and 25 in the box in the middle of the screen. By doing so you 
simultaneously decide how many ECU you transfer to the private account (alternative A; i.e. 
25 – contribution to the project). After you typed in the amount, you have to click OK to 
confirm. You cannot revise your decision once you have confirmed it.  
Second Stage 
In the second stage feedback on your payoff and its single components in the respective round 
is provided. You see on screen how you have distributed your endowment on alternative A 
and B, your payoff from the project and your total payoff in this round. You do not have to 
make a decision in this stage. 
 
 
 
 
A.3. Instructions for the rematching of pairs in baseline 1 
Detailed description of the pairing process after each phase 
After each phase you see the following information screen: 
 
 
You see a table where the contributions of all group members in the previous rounds are listed. 
Additionally, you obtain information on the pairings of group members in the previous phase. 
In the example above, group member A was paired with C, B with D and E with F. 
Furthermore, you obtain information on your total payoff in the previous phase and once 
again your and your co-player’s identification code. 
After you have confirmed this screen (in any case after 90 seconds) the next phase starts. At 
the beginning of the current phase pairs of group members are again randomly formed. You 
will learn again your identification code (which remains the same) and the identification code 
of your co-player on screen. 
This process of forming new pairs will be conducted at the beginning of each new phase.
A.3. Instructions for the rematching of pairs in baseline 2 
Detailed description of the pairing process after each phas) 
After each phase you see the following information screen: 
 
 
You see a table which contains information on the pairings of group members in the previous 
phase. In the example above, group member A was paired with B, C with D and E with F. 
Furthermore, you obtain information on your total payoff in the previous phase and once 
again your and your co-player’s identification code. 
 
After you have confirmed this screen (in any case after 90 seconds) the next phase starts. At 
the beginning of the current phase pairs of group members are again randomly formed. You 
will learn again your identification code (which remains the same) and the identification code 
of your co-player on screen. 
This process of forming new pairs will be conducted at the beginning of each new phase.
A.4. Instructions for the rematching of pairs in the unilateral treatment 
Detailed description of the pairing process after each phase 
After each phase you see the following information screen: 
 
 
You see a table where the contributions of all group members in the previous rounds are listed. 
Additionally, you obtain information on the pairings of group members in the previous phase. 
In the example above, group member A was paired with F, B with C and D with E. 
Furthermore, you obtain information on your total payoff in the previous phase and once 
again your and your co-player’s ident ification code. 
 
At the bottom of the screen you see 5 boxes in order to evaluate the 5 other group members. 
The evaluation should be done in a ranking from one to 5. You have to rate your other group 
members in the light of your desire to get them as a co-player for the next phase. The group 
member, with whom you would like to be paired most preferably, should be assigned rank 1, 
and the group member, with whom you would like to be paired least preferably should be 
assigned rank 5. For assigning rank one please type in 1 in the box below the identification 
code of the respective group member, for assigning rank two type in 2, for assigning rank 
three type in 3, for assigning rank four type in 4, and for assigning rank five type in 5. 
Afterwards you have the opportunity to bid for having the right to choose a co-player, which 
entitles you to choose the group member that will be your co-player for the next phase. 
Auctioning the right to choose a co-player 
Each group member receives and auction endowment of 100 ECU, which he/she can either 
keep or use for the auction.  In this auction all six group members have the opportunity to 
purchase the right to choose a co-player, which enables the winner of this right to choose the 
co-player for the next phase among the remaining group members. In total, two group 
members can win this right that means there will be two auctions. The winner of an auction 
receives the right to choose the co-player, has to pay the second-highest price submitted and is 
entitled to choose the preferred co-player. All group members submit their bid at the same 
time and therefore do not learn about the bids of the others. 
First auction 
For the auction the following screen appears: 
 
In the upper half of the screen the same information as on the previous screen is displayed. 
Additionally, there is a box on the lower right hand to type in your bid. In this box you have 
to type in a bid from 0 to 100. If you do not want to participate in the auction, please type in 0.  
After everyone has submitted a bid, the winner is found. 
 
You are the winner of the first auction if you submitted the highest bid in your group. This 
entitles you to choose one among the remaining 5 group members as your co-player for the 
next phase and you have to pay the second highest bid submitted. This amount will be 
deducted from your auction endowment, the rest will be added to your payoffs at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
In order to choose a co-player the following screen appears only for the winner of the first 
auction: 
 
 
The contributions of all group members in the previous rounds are again listed. Below the 
winner sees how much (s)he has to pay for the right to choose a co-player and (s)he can type 
in the respective number of the co-player (s)he chooses. 
Example: 
Suppose the following bids are ranked left to right from highest to lowest, i.e. player B 
submitted the highest bid, C the second highest and so on. In this case B is the winner of the 
first auction. Player B can therefore choose his/her preferred co-player and pays a price 
amounting to the bid player C submitted (second highest bid).  
B: ECU C: ECU D: ECU E: ECU F: ECU 
 
Please note: 
a) If more than one group member submitted the highest bid, the winner of the first 
auction is determined randomly out of these subjects.  
b) If all 6 group members submit the same bid, all three pairs will be formed 
randomly.  
In both cases you will be informed on the screen. 
Second Auction 
You only participate in the second auction if you  
a) are not the winner of the first auction 
b) have not been chosen as a co-player by the winner of the first auction 
 
Again, a screen will appear containing a box to submit your bid in the second auction as well 
as the identification codes of the group members who still participate in this second auction 
and who can still be chosen. At the bottom of the screen you can again submit a bid from 0 to 
100 to the box. If you do not want to participate in the second auction, please type in 0. 
 
Your are the winner of the second auction if you have submitted the highest bid of the four 
remaining group members. This entitles you to choose one among the three other group 
members as your co-player for the next phase and you have to pay the second highest bid  
submitted. This amount will be deducted from your auction endowment, the rest will be added 
to your payoffs at the end of the experiment. 
In order to choose a co-player a screen will appear on which the winner of the second auction 
sees the group members who are still available and can type in the number of the respective 
group member (s)he chooses. 
Please note again: 
a) If more than one group member submitted the highest bid, the winner of the 
second auction is determined randomly out of these subjects.  
b) If all 4 group members submit the same bid, the remaining two pairs will be 
formed randomly. 
In both cases you will be informed on the screen. 
 
If you are neither winner of the first nor winner of the second auction and you have not been 
chosen  as co-player by any of the two winners you will automatically form a pair for the next 
phase with the other remaining group member.  
If you are not a winner in any of the two auctions your total auction endowment will be added 
to your payoffs at the end of the experiment.  
 
Thank you for your participation and good luck! 
 
A.5. Ins tructions for the rematching of pairs in the mutual agreement treatment 
Detailed description of the pairing process after each phase 
After each phase you see the following information screen: 
 
 
You see a table where the contributions of all group members in the previous rounds are listed. 
Additionally, you obtain information on the pairings of group members in the previous phase. 
In the example above, group member A was paired with C, B with E and D with F. 
Furthermore, you obtain information on your total payoff in the previous phase and once 
again your and your co-player’s identification code. 
Detailed description of the co-player selection: 
Each group member obtains an endowment of 100 ECU, which (s)he can either keep or use 
for the co-player selection in order to be paired with a desired group member in the next phase. 
You can assign all or parts this endowment to one or several group members. On the screen 
you see five input boxes associated with the identification codes of your group members. 
Please note, that you have to fill in all five boxes, that means if you do not want to assign a 
positive amount to the respective group member, please type in 0. The amounts that you fill in 
will not be transferred to this person, but just deducted from your payoff. This means that the 
endowment not assigned (100-amounts assigned) will be added to your payoffs at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
After all players have assigned amounts (0 or positive) to all other group members, the 
computer will calculate the sum of mutual assignments for each possible pair. For example: 
the sum of mutuals assignments of A and B consists of the amount that player A assigned to B 
and the amount that player B assigned to A. In analogy, the calculations for all possible pairs 
A-C, A-D, …, B-C, B-D and so on are done. Subsequently, the sums of mutual ECU 
assignments for every possible combination of pairs is calculated. 
In total, there are 15 different combinations of pairs, which can occur within the group as you 
see in the table below. A-B, C-D, E-F, for instance, means that A is paired with B, C is paired 
with D and E is paired with F. 
 
1: A-B, C-D, E-F 4: A-C, B-D, E-F 7: A-D, B-C, E-F 10: A-E, B-C, D-F 13: A-F, B-C, D-E 
2: A-B, C-E, D-F 5: A-C, B-E, D-F 8: A-D, B-E, C-F 11: A-E, B-D, C-F 14: A-F, B-D, C-E 
3: A-B, C-F, D-E 6: A-C, B-F, D-E 9: A-D, B-F, C-E 12: A-E, B-F, C-D 15: A-F, B-E, C-D 
 
The computer chooses the combination of pairs, that yields the highest sum of mutual ECU 
assignments. These pairings are implemented in the next phase. The following example will 
clarify this process. 
 
 
Example: 
In order to illustrate how the computer chooses the pairings that will be implemented, please 
consider the simplified case of only 4 group members. The calculations are completely 
analogous for 6 group members. 
With 4 group members W, X, Y and Z only the following 3 combinations of pairs within the 
group are possible: 
1: W-X, Y-Z 
2: W-Y, X-Z 
3: W-Z, X-Y 
Supposing the 4 players assign amounts to each other in the following way. The boxes 
correspond to the screen inputs for each player. 
 
W:  
 
X: 
 
Y: 
 
Z: 
 
The computer calculates the sum of mutual ECU assignments for each pair, and subsequently 
adds up these sums for each of the three possible combinations of pairs. The combination of 
pairs that yields the highest total sum of mutual ECU assignments is selected. Those pairs are 
implemented in the next phase. In the example above the calculations are done in the 
following way: 
 
1. For the combination W with X and Y with Z: 
W assigns to X 72, X assigns to W 65, yielding a sum of 137. 
Y assigns to Z 81, Z assigns to Y 16, yielding a sum of  97. 
Adding up those two sums, we obtain the sum of mutual ECU assignments for the first 
possible combination of pairs within the group. This total sum amounts to 137 + 97 = 234. 
 
2. For the combination W with Y and Y with Z: 
W assigns to Y 0, Y assigns to W 12, yielding a sum of 12. 
X assigns to Z 5, Z assigns to X 31, yielding a sum of 36. 
Adding up those two sums, we obtain the sum of mutual ECU assignments for the second 
possible combination of pairs within the group. This total sum amounts to 12 + 36 = 48.  
W X Z 
W X Y 
X Y Z 
72 0 12 
W Y Z 
65 27 5 
12 0 81 
8 31 16 
3. For the combination W with Z and X with Y: 
W assigns to Z 12, Z assigns to W 8, yielding a sum of 20. 
X assigns to Y 27, Y assigns to X 0, yielding a sum of 27. 
Adding up those two sums, we obtain the sum of mutual ECU assignments for the third 
possible combination of pairs within the group. This total sum amounts to 20 + 27 = 47.  
 
The computer selects the combination that yields the highest total sum. In the example above 
it chooses combination 1: W with X and Y with Z, because with this combination the total 
sum of mutual ECU assignemts is 234 and thus higher than the total sum of any other 
combination of pairs. This combination is implemented in the next phase, meaning that the 
pairs are formed according to this combination. 
 
Considering the example above one can derive some general statements: 
 
It is possible to assign a positive amount to more than one group member. As you can see in 
the example, player W has assigned player X and player Z a positive amount. This provides 
the possibility to state a preference for several group members, whereby a higher amount for 
one player means that (s)he is preferred to the other. 
 
The higher the amount you assign to a specific group member, the higher the chances of being 
paired with that group member in the next phase. That means, if two group members want to 
be paired in the next phase , both should assign a positive amount to each other. You see in 
the example, that W and X have assigned high amounts to each other leading to their pairing 
for the next phase. 
 
Coming back to the general case of 6 group members, please note the following additional 
rules: 
a) If two or more of the 15 possible combinations yield equal total sums, one of thise 
combinations is determined randomly and the respective pairs are implemented in 
the next phase.  
b) If no one assigns a positive amount to any other group member, the pairs are 
determined randomly.  
c) If each group member assigns the same amount to every single other group 
member, the pairs are determined randomly. This case implies that the total sums 
of all possible combinations are equal.  
After the pairs are selected by the computer, every group member learns the identification 
code of his new co-player for the next phase. 
 
Thank you for your participation and good luck! 
A.6. Control questionnaire for the public good game in all treatments 
Control Questions 
The control questions serve for your better understanding only. The experimenters will come 
to your place and check for the right answers. In case you provide wrong answers, you are 
asked to revise them. The experiment continues as soon as everyone has filled in the right 
answers. However, your answers in this questionnaire will not influence for final payoff in 
any way. 
 
1. You and your co-player have got an endowment of 25 ECU. No one contributes to the 
common project, that means you and your co-player both tranfer the whole 
endowment of 25 ECU to the private account.  
 What is your payoff in this round? ________________ 
 What is the payoff of your co-player in this round?  ________________ 
 
2. You and your co-player have got an endowment of 25 ECU. You and your co-player 
both contribute the whole endowment of 25 ECU to the project.  
 What is your payoff in this round? ________________ 
 What is the payoff of your co-player in this round?  ________________ 
 
3. You and your co-player have got an endowment of 25 ECU. Your co-player 
contributes 10 ECU to the project.  
 What is your payoff in this round, if you contribute 10 ECU to the project?
 ________________ 
 What is your payoff in this round, if you contribute 0 ECU to the project?
 ________________ 
A.7. Additional control questionnaire for the unilateral treatment 
 
4. Your identification code is A, and in the first auction you submit a bid of 45 ECU. The 
remaining bids are as follows: 
B: 37 C: 30 D: 61 E: 37 F: 31 
Who wins the first auction, how much does the winner have to pay (auction price) and 
what added to the winner’s payoff at the end of the experiment (rest)? Assume that the 
group member chosen be the first winner is F, who participates in the second auction? 
 winner’s identification code: ___________ auction price: ________________ 
 rest: ______________  
 identification codes of participants in the second auction : ______________________ 
 
A.7. Additional control questionnaire for the mutual agreement treatment 
 
4. Please consider the simplified case of only 4 group members. 
Assume that the 4 players W, X, Y and Z assign amounts to each other in the following way: 
 
W:  
 
X: 
 
Y: 
 
Z: 
 
With 4 group members W, X, Y and Z only the following 3 combinations of pairs within the 
group are possible: 
1: W with X, Y with Z 
2: W with Y, X with Z 
3: W with Z, X with Y 
Which pairs are going to be implemented in the next phase? Please calculate step-by-step the 
sums of mutual ECU assignments for each of the 3 combinations in the following way. Please 
copy the amounts of the boxes above and calculate the sum of mutual ECU assignments in 
each row (*). Then, add up both sums to the total sum of mutual ECU assignments of this 
combination (#). 
 
combination 1:  
W assigns to X _____,   X assigns to W______,   sum:_______ (*) 
Y assigns to Z ______,   Z assigns to Y ______,   sum:_______ (*) 
 total sum:________ (#) 
 
combination 2: 
W assigns to Y _____,   Y assigns to W______,   sum:_______ (*) 
X assigns to Z ______,   Z assigns to X ______,   sum:_______ (*) 
 total sum:________ (#) 
X Y Z 
W Y Z 
W X Z 
W X Y 
12 65 0 
72 12 0 
27 16 31 
5 81 8 
 combination 3: 
W assigns to Z _____,   Z assigns to W______,   sum:_______ (*) 
X assigns to Y ______,   Y assigns to X ______,   sum:_______ (*) 
 total sum:________ (#) 
 
Combination _____ is chosen by the computer. Thus, the following pairs are implemented:  
___ with___, ___ with ____ 
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